237 lines
9.9 KiB
C
237 lines
9.9 KiB
C
/*
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* Secure Remote Password 6a implementation
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* Copyright (c) 2010 Tom Cocagne. All rights reserved.
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* https://github.com/cocagne/csrp
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*
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* The MIT License (MIT)
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2014 Tom Cocagne
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*
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* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
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* this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
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* the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
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* use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
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* of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
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* so, subject to the following conditions:
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*
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* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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* copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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* SOFTWARE.
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*
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*===========================================================================
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* updated (2023) by fduncanh to replace deprecated openssl SHA* hash functions
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* modified (2023) by fduncanh for use with Apple's pair-setup-pin protocol
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*/
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/*
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*
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* Purpose: This is a direct implementation of the Secure Remote Password
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* Protocol version 6a as described by
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* http://srp.stanford.edu/design.html
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*
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* Author: tom.cocagne@gmail.com (Tom Cocagne)
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*
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* Dependencies: OpenSSL (and Advapi32.lib on Windows)
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*
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* Usage: Refer to test_srp.c for a demonstration
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*
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* Notes:
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* This library allows multiple combinations of hashing algorithms and
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* prime number constants. For authentication to succeed, the hash and
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* prime number constants must match between
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* srp_create_salted_verification_key(), srp_user_new(),
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* and srp_verifier_new(). A recommended approach is to determine the
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* desired level of security for an application and globally define the
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* hash and prime number constants to the predetermined values.
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*
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* As one might suspect, more bits means more security. As one might also
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* suspect, more bits also means more processing time. The test_srp.c
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* program can be easily modified to profile various combinations of
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* hash & prime number pairings.
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*/
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#ifndef SRP_H
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#define SRP_H
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#define APPLE_VARIANT
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struct SRPVerifier;
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#if 0 /*begin removed section 1*/
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struct SRPUser;
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#endif /*end removed section 1*/
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typedef enum
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{
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#if 0 /* begin removed section 2*/
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SRP_NG_1024,
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SRP_NG_1536,
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#endif /* end removed section 2*/
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SRP_NG_2048,
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#if 0 /* begin removed section 3*/
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SRP_NG_3072,
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SRP_NG_4096,
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SRP_NG_6144,
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SRP_NG_8192,
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#endif /* end removed section 3*/
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SRP_NG_CUSTOM
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} SRP_NGType;
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typedef enum
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{
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SRP_SHA1,
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SRP_SHA224,
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SRP_SHA256,
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SRP_SHA384,
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SRP_SHA512
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} SRP_HashAlgorithm;
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/* This library will automatically seed the OpenSSL random number generator
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* using cryptographically sound random data on Windows & Linux. If this is
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* undesirable behavior or the host OS does not provide a /dev/urandom file,
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* this function may be called to seed the random number generator with
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* alternate data.
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*
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* The random data should include at least as many bits of entropy as the
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* largest hash function used by the application. So, for example, if a
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* 512-bit hash function is used, the random data requies at least 512
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* bits of entropy.
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*
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* Passing a null pointer to this function will cause this library to skip
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* seeding the random number generator. This is only legitimate if it is
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* absolutely known that the OpenSSL random number generator has already
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* been sufficiently seeded within the running application.
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*
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* Notes:
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* * This function is optional on Windows & Linux and mandatory on all
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* other platforms.
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*/
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void srp_random_seed( const unsigned char * random_data, int data_length );
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/* Out: bytes_s, len_s, bytes_v, len_v
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*
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* The caller is responsible for freeing the memory allocated for bytes_s and bytes_v
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*
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* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type.
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* If provided, they must contain ASCII text of the hexidecimal notation.
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*
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*/
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void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
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SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
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const unsigned char * password, int len_password,
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const unsigned char ** bytes_s, int * len_s,
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const unsigned char ** bytes_v, int * len_v,
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const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
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#ifdef APPLE_VARIANT
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/* Out: bytes_B, len_B
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* On failure, bytes_B will be set to NULL and len_B will be set to 0
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*
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* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type
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*
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* bytes_b should be a pointer to a cryptographically secure random array of length
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* len_b bytes (for example, produced with OpenSSL's RAND_bytes(bytes_b, len_b)).
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*/
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void srp_create_server_ephemeral_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
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const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
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const unsigned char * bytes_b, int len_b,
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const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B,
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const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex,
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int rfc5054_compat );
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#endif
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/* Out: bytes_B, len_B.
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*
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* On failure, bytes_B will be set to NULL and len_B will be set to 0
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*
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* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type
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*
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* If rfc5054_compat is non-zero the resulting verifier will be RFC 5054 compaliant. This
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* breaks compatibility with previous versions of the csrp library but is recommended
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* for new code.
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*/
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struct SRPVerifier * srp_verifier_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
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const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
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const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
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const unsigned char * bytes_A, int len_A,
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#ifdef APPLE_VARIANT
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const unsigned char * bytes_b, int len_b,
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#endif
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const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B,
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const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex,
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int rfc5054_compat );
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void srp_verifier_delete( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
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int srp_verifier_is_authenticated( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
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const char * srp_verifier_get_username( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
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/* key_length may be null */
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const unsigned char * srp_verifier_get_session_key( struct SRPVerifier * ver, int * key_length );
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int srp_verifier_get_session_key_length( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
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/* user_M must be exactly srp_verifier_get_session_key_length() bytes in size */
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/* (in APPLE_VARIANT case, session_key_length is DOUBLE the length of user_M) */
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void srp_verifier_verify_session( struct SRPVerifier * ver,
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const unsigned char * user_M,
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const unsigned char ** bytes_HAMK );
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/*******************************************************************************/
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/* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type
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*
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* If rfc5054_compat is non-zero the resulting verifier will be RFC 5054 compaliant. This
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* breaks compatibility with previous versions of the csrp library but is recommended
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* for new code.
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*/
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#if 0 /*begin removed section 4 */
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struct SRPUser * srp_user_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
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const unsigned char * bytes_password, int len_password,
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const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex,
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int rfc5054_compat );
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void srp_user_delete( struct SRPUser * usr );
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int srp_user_is_authenticated( struct SRPUser * usr);
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const char * srp_user_get_username( struct SRPUser * usr );
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/* key_length may be null */
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const unsigned char * srp_user_get_session_key( struct SRPUser * usr, int * key_length );
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int srp_user_get_session_key_length( struct SRPUser * usr );
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/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */
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void srp_user_start_authentication( struct SRPUser * usr, const char ** username,
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const unsigned char ** bytes_A, int * len_A );
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/* Output: bytes_M, len_M (len_M may be null and will always be
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* srp_user_get_session_key_length() bytes in size) */
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/* (in APPLE_VARIANT case, session_key_length is DOUBLE the length of bytes_M) */
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void srp_user_process_challenge( struct SRPUser * usr,
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const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
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const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
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const unsigned char ** bytes_M, int * len_M );
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/* bytes_HAMK must be exactly srp_user_get_session_key_length() bytes in size */
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/* (in APPLE_VARIANT case, session_key_length is DOUBLE the length of bytes_HAMK) */
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void srp_user_verify_session( struct SRPUser * usr, const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK );
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#endif /*end removed section 4*/
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#endif /* Include Guard */
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